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Abstract
Throughout its history, but also squeezed between the current challenges of globalisation and sovereignty, the Balkans has 
been confronted with a number of different political, economic, environmental, and cultural problems. Such a complex social 
framework inevitably implies spatial degradation, not only in terms of the urban forms as the final planning product, but 
also in terms of the nature of the planning process and urban governance. Notably, we assume that territorial capital in the 
Balkans is under serious threat due to the abuse of legal procedures, the neglect of the public interest and the politicisation 
of planning. To elucidate this, we focus on the megaprojects Belgrade Waterfront (Belgrade) and Hellinikon (Athens) as 
examples of urban development that require exceptional conditions such as special regulations, additional funding, long-term 
timeframes, and ad hoc actor networks. Against the conceptual background of multi-level governance and based on in-depth 
case studies, we examine the nature of vertical cooperation between authorities at different levels (from supranational to 
local), horizontal cooperation amongst different stakeholders, and the role of planning professionals who are seen as facili-
tators in this process. Finally, we point out to the most important conditions that enable a democratic social, political and 
professional framework for urban megaprojects.
Keywords Urban development · Megaprojects · Multi-level governance · Belgrade Waterfront · Hellinikon
Introduction: the Balkans’ position 
against global trends in spatial 
and territorial development
The Balkans is one of the largest regions in Europe. In geo-
graphical terms, it covers an area of the Balkan Peninsula 
bounded by the Adriatic Sea to the west, the Mediterranean 
Sea (including both the Ionian and Aegean Seas) and the 
Marmara Sea to the south, and the Black Sea to the east, 
and the Kupa-Sava-Danube river line to the north (Fig. 1). 
However, as there is no consensus on the northern border of 
the peninsula itself, geography is only one aspect that brings 
to the complexity of the region. Namely, the Balkans, as a 
term extending beyond the physical borders of the peninsula, 
is synonymous with a diversity of cultures, religions, lan-
guages, ideologies, and ethnographies (Fig. 2).
The Balkans had a highly turbulent past (Faludi 2018; 
Hajdu and Racz 2011; Diklic 2014; Aleksic 2020; Zizek 
1999; D’hondt 2017; Nedovic-Budic and Cavric 2006). 
Ancient Greece, i.e. the city-state of Athens, is considered 
a cradle of western civilization, whilst Byzantium later 
became the economic, cultural, and political centre of all 
of Europe. However, the legacies of the Western Roman 
Empire, together with those of the mediaeval states of Ser-
bia and Bulgaria, were highly contested by the Ottomans’ 
attack that kept the reign over the Balkans until the early 
nineteenth century. As a result, the initial state-formation 
process followed by the Balkan Wars and the two World 
Wars took place in multi-ethnic regions. During the Cold 
War period, the diversity of ideologies and political systems 
in the area was considerable: the Balkans was home to a 
capitalist western democracy (Greece), non-aligned socialist 
Yugoslavia, the states behind the Iron Curtain (Romania and 
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Bulgaria), as well as the communist Albania influenced by 
China. The fall of the Berlin Wall together with the rise of 
nationalist tendencies in the federal states of Yugoslavia led 
to the dissolution of the country. However, the consequences 
were felt throughout the region highlighting again the ethnic 
factors. On the one hand, Greece saw the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia as a historical, political and security 
threat, which was dissolved almost thirty years later when 
the new state name of North Macedonia was coined in 2019. 
On the other hand, the position of the Albanians living in the 
diverse parts of former Yugoslavia and Greece was strongly 
affected as they gained political significance.
The current political and territorial dispute still relates 
mainly to the unresolved issue of Kosovo and its self-
declared independence from Serbia in 2008. Since it is not 
only a problem of regional and European importance, but 
also of global interest, its resolution, together with NATO 
membership, determines the pace and conditions for Ser-
bia and other Western Balkan countries to join the Euro-
pean Union (EU). As the Balkans constantly suffers from 
internal social, political and economic problems, it is not 
considered a priority for EU funding (Acebillo 2015; Peric 
and Niedermaier 2019; Peric and Scholl 2017; Evmolpidis 
2016; Vourdas 2016). However, China under the Belt and 
Road Initiative, but also Russia, Turkey and the United Arab 
Emirates consider the Balkans as a strategic destination of 
geopolitical significance, and, accordingly, invest in a num-
ber of ports (Piraeus, Thessaloniki), railway lines (Bar-
Belgrade, Sarajevo-Belgrade, Belgrade-Budapest), energy 
facilities, and urban redevelopment projects (Scholl et al. 
2019). As facing weak national economic conditions, the 
Balkan countries usually have no other choice but to adopt 
Fig. 1  The Balkan Peninsula in Europe. Copyright: ArnoldPlaton
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the offers from foreign developers, consciously neglecting 
the domestic values (Cukic and Peric 2019).
Against the background of historical and current conflicts, 
it is rather a challenging task to achieve integration in the 
Balkans – integration amongst people, across territories and 
across ways of thinking and perceiving both problems and 
possible solutions. In addition to such a cacophony, perma-
nent existential problems prevent wise territorial governance 
and management of both urban and rural areas, particularly 
in a collaborative manner that is considered standard for 
activities related to the development of the built environ-
ment and preservation of landscapes (Peric and Nieder-
maier 2019; D’hondt 2017; Mrdjenovic 2013, 2014). As a 
consequence, the territorial capital of the Balkan region is 
highly endangered.
A number of global and European polices that emerged 
over the last twenty years embrace the idea of making 
‘human settlements safe, inclusive, resilient and sustain-
able’ as defined in the Sustainable Development Goal 11 
(UN 2015). In addition to the 2030 Agenda for Sustaina-
ble Development (UN 2015), the New Urban Agenda (UN 
2017) also promotes integrated spatial approach, recognizing 
the importance of: (1) cooperation between various bod-
ies: national governments, local authorities, civil society, 
and planning professionals, and (2) planning for various 
levels: transnational, national, regional, city, municipal, 
Fig. 2  Ethnographical map reproduced from The Balkan Peninsula by Jovan Cvijić. Source: La Péninsule balkanique.  Géographie humaine, 
1918. Copyright: British Library Imaging Services
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and neighbourhood level. Urban Agenda for the EU (EC 
2016) places an emphasis on the policy making based on 
the intrinsic contribution of citizens through various forms 
of urban governance that support public voices at differ-
ent levels—from urban design projects to strategic master 
plans. Territorial Agenda of the European Union 2020 (EU 
Ministers 2011) clearly promotes, inter alia, cooperation 
between different spatial units by respecting the goals and 
principles amongst strategies at different scales: from those 
addressing the transnationally important topics, to national 
and regional priorities and local incentives. Green Paper on 
Territorial Cohesion (CEC 2008) in addressing European 
spatial and territorial development,1 promotes the following 
principles: functional territorial development, place-based 
approach, multi-level governance, multi-sectorial coopera-
tion, and territorial integration. Finally, the European Spa-
tial Development Perspective (CSD 1999) clearly prioritizes 
effective actor networks and efficient mechanisms for public 
participation, but also for involving all other parties in the 
common quest for balanced spatial development.
Following this line of argumentation, to strengthen ter-
ritorial capital of the Balkans means to (1) substantially 
improve cooperation between the different jurisdictional/
territorial levels (e.g. national, regional, local) both in the 
policy making process and in practical implementation, 
and (2) to stimulate interactions between numerous actors 
– public administration, professional organizations, local and 
regional entrepreneurs, civic associations, i.e. those respon-
sible for and affected by spatial transformation. Hence, this 
paper attempts to elucidate the concept of multi-level gov-
ernance (MLG) and to illustrate its application to urban 
megaprojects. Since megaprojects are considered a spatial 
manifestation of neoliberalism, they are usually initiated 
by global actors with economic power, but to be properly 
deployed, they must be adapted to specific national and 
local conditions. This requests mutual adjustments between 
the global players and specific administrative rules, profes-
sional milieus and local identities. Empirically we examine 
a variety of actor networks in two major hubs in the Balkans 
– Belgrade and Athens. The capitals of Serbia and Greece, 
respectively, are selected as relevant cases as they currently 
host the largest urban developments in the Balkans initiated 
by supranational actors, and, consequently, are useful test-
beds for exploring interrelationships amongst actors exercis-
ing power at various scales—dominant global developers, 
national governments in coalition with foreign investors at 
the expense of the public interest of their own countries, and 
professionals and citizens in an attempt to curb the negative 
effects of mentioned partnerships.
The paper is structured as follows. After introductory 
remarks, we examine the premises of MLG’s approach to 
decision-making, emphasising in particular the relationships 
between different stakeholders from various sectors (pub-
lic, but also private and civil) at the local (city) level. By 
attending to the planning traditions and planning cultures 
of Serbia and Greece, we tend to shed light on the planning 
contexts of the current megaprojects in Belgrade and Ath-
ens—the Belgrade Waterfront project and the Hellinikon 
project, respectively. The central part of the paper is devoted 
to the identification of local responses to global trends in 
urban development to recognize the main anomalies in both 
cases, as well as their mutual similarities and/or differences. 
Finally, we provide an overview of basic guidelines to avoid 
further spatial degradation in the Balkans.
Multi‑level territorial governance: 
a conceptual overview
The arguments for and against MLG
Multi-level governance (MLG) is mainly seen as a result 
of the shift from government to governance throughout the 
1980s (Rhodes 1996; Davoudi and Strange 2009). This shift 
“refers to the diminished role of governmental hierarchy, at 
the same time highlighting the stronger influence of non-
state actors who are mutually interdependent in a collabora-
tive policy making process directed towards achieving com-
mon interests” (Peric 2019, p. 96). Accordingly, we differ 
two main dimension of MLG: the ‘multi-level’ dimension, 
which is focused on the relationships between various lev-
els of public authorities—supranational, national and sub-
national; and the dimension of ‘governance’, addressing 
multi-stakeholder collaboration amongst the representa-
tives of various sectors—public, private and civil (Bache 
and Flinders 2004; Böhme et al. 2015; Piattoni 2016). In 
other words, the MLG concept includes both the aspects of 
territorial hierarchy and functional unity.
However, implementing the principle of MLG in practice 
faces various problems (Faludi 2012; Piattoni 2016). Briefly, 
the nature of the dynamics is fuzzy, i.e.: (1) the engagement 
of certain governmental and non-governmental bodies is not 
clear enough, (2) networking amongst various sectors is not 
fully applied, but rather it assumes the cooperation between 
various jurisdictional scales, and, finally, (3) it is difficult to 
define the government level(s) that should be particularly 
active in governance processes.
Criticisms mentioned above point to specific territo-
rial/administrative levels, i.e. the clarification of certain 
1 The basic difference between spatial and territorial development 
can be briefly explained as follows: spatial development aims at a 
balanced growth of all the spatial units that form certain area, whilst 
territorial development promotes the further development of the areas 
with a high development capacity, i.e. not necessarily the least devel-
oped areas (Peric and Niedermaier 2019).
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sectors and authorities, as well as their mutual relation-
ships, which together contribute to the effectiveness of the 
MLG approach. This is, however, strongly influenced by the 
general need and reason for collaboration (Peric 2016). The 
dual character of the MLG concept—vertical cooperation 
amongst jurisdictional/territorial levels and horizontal coop-
eration aimed at functional unity, comes to the fore again. 
The ESPON’s ‘Rubikube’ of MLG differs nine important 
‘levels of action’ in the MLG process: supranational/EU, 
transnational, cross-border, national, interregional, regional, 
sub-regional, local, and sub-local levels (ESPON 2013). The 
following section briefly highlights different objectives, 
types and deliverables of the cooperation at the local ter-
ritorial scale.
The role of the local level in MLG
The local level in the process of MLG gains great impor-
tance for several reasons (Peric 2019). Firstly, local stake-
holders have a broad awareness of the majority of the prob-
lems, values, obstacles and opportunities that dominate 
the local situation (Böhme et al. 2015; Hooghe and Marks 
2010). Secondly, a pragmatic and action-oriented approach 
at local level is easy to apply compared to some higher terri-
torial and administrative scales (Scholl 2012). Accordingly, 
intrinsic features of a place that is shaped by the needs and 
visions of numerous actors, and is not only regulated by 
administrative bodies, are more apparent on a smaller ter-
ritorial scale. Consequently, cooperation between different 
local stakeholders streamlines the implementation of certain 
measures (Böhme et al. 2015).
The main types of cooperation at the local level are: inter-
sectoral and interdisciplinary cooperation. On the one hand, 
“the structured partnerships between policy makers, private 
sector and civil society are necessary to mobilize wider soci-
etal support for development” (Peric 2019, p. 101). As these 
sectors use different approaches to tackle complex problems 
(e.g. developers’ profit versus public accountability), only 
well-structured collaboration can ensure the achievement of 
different interests without denying certain parties and their 
goals. On the other hand, “the synergy amongst different 
knowledge pools, skills, know-how and tools facilitates the 
governance process, thus, ultimately, contributing to the 
transformation of thinking patterns as the main outcome 
of the changed governance model at the local level” (Peric 
2019, p. 101).
The interdependence between various sectors and disci-
plines requires forms of social learning across diverse webs 
of institutional and organizational action (Hooghe and Marks 
2010). Considering not only the expertise, but also ‘experi-
ential’ knowledge and skills, calls for a role of mediator and/
or facilitator of the MLG process (Bache and Flinders 2004; 
Davoudi and Strange 2009). When applying this process to 
the field of urban development, the facilitator’s role is usu-
ally devoted to planning professionals. In better anticipation 
and preparation for current and plausible problems, planners 
should “be acquainted with the context where they operate, 
capable of constant capacity-building, able of conducting 
socially justified activities and, thus, producing sustainable 
spatial solutions” (Peric and Hoch 2017, p. 1251).
In sum, the MLG process in an urban development pro-
ject, i.e. at local/urban/city level, emphasizes the govern-
ance aspect more than vertical cooperation between different 
authorities. Such an approach requires constructive coopera-
tion between different sectors to achieve consensus-building 
and to arrive at solutions that are acceptable to all interested 
parties (Le Gales 1998; Brenner 2004; Bache and Flinders 
2004). Accordingly, the roles of the relevant actors are 
defined as follows:
(1) The private sector as the initiator of urban development 
is valued because the ultimate goal is the functional 
unity, i.e. the agreement between stakeholders on a 
common vision for future development;
(2) The public authorities are responsible for providing the 
necessary institutional and regulatory support to imple-
ment the development idea;
(3) Experts are important actors as they enable the whole 
process to be as transparent, efficient and effective as 
possible;
(4) The civil sector is seen as a corrective factor in case that 
development leads to socio-spatial distortions.
The assumed assignments and role of various stake-
holders in an urban governance process speak for boost-
ing the capacity to organize collective actions aimed at 
building partnerships directed towards specific goals. Such 
an approach found a particular relevance for solving com-
plex problems. Hence, urban megaprojects associated with 
dynamic and complex relationships between different stake-
holders provide a fertile ground for exploring the MLG con-
cept in urban planning practice.
Methodology: exploring urban 
megaprojects in the Balkans
Urban megaprojects require functional unity around a spatial 
problem such as: lack of infrastructure for basic services, 
obsolete transport infrastructure, or dilapidated superstruc-
ture in central or exclusive districts like waterfronts (Swyn-
gedouw et al. 2002). Since public funding is usually insuffi-
cient to cover (re)development costs, global economic actors 
(banks, funds, private consortia) come to the fore (Flyvbjerg 
2014). Consequently, they require less informal, but more 
intense horizontal cooperation amongst stakeholders at the 
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local level without strong control by public authorities at 
higher administrative levels (Brenner 2004). Nevertheless, 
entrepreneurial spirit and political support offered at national 
scale are a necessary prerequisite for international develop-
ers to pursue megaprojects (Brenner 2004; del Cerro San-
tamaria 2013). Briefly put, the ‘iron-law of megaprojects’ 
(Flyvbjerg 2017), which is based on the logic of exception, 
e.g. extra budget, special regulations, non-standard organiza-
tional structure, questioning of public accountability, and the 
central role of developers at the expense of the city leaders, 
planners and citizens, makes urban megaprojects an interest-
ing case for exploring the principles of MLG, as described 
in the previous section.
Although it is generally accepted that the planning, 
governance and implementation of megaprojects is quite 
similar regardless of the context – developed Global North 
or developing Global South (del Cerro Santamaria 2013; 
Lee 2012; Flyvbjerg 2009), there are some variations in the 
implementation of megaprojects in ‘sensitive’ societies, e.g. 
in transitional, post-socialist countries or countries facing 
economic downturn.
The boost of global economy makes urban megaprojects 
an attractive model for the development of urban patterns 
in post-socialist states faced with political, institutional and 
market transition (Cook 2010; Cope 2015; Zekovic et al. 
2018). However, as the key drive behind any urban megapro-
ject is extra-profit for its developers, megaprojects in the 
context of wild neoliberalism clearly point to “social distor-
tions caused by the superior position of the private sector, 
opportunism within government structures, lack of profes-
sional expertise and, finally, neglect of the public interest” 
(Peric 2020a, p. 213). Urban megaprojects are also a pop-
ular means of addressing urban development in societies 
with defaulted economies (Prentou 2012; Papaioannou and 
Nikolakopoulou 2016; Zifou 2015). In order to overcome the 
economic downturn, national governments neglect the social 
and environmental aspects of territorial capital and instead 
focus on space only as a tool for economic growth. Con-
sequently, privatisation and deregulation become the main 
strategy for the megaproject development (Komninos 2014).
With previous in mind, we want to elucidate the local 
feedback to a global trend of megaproject development in 
Serbia and Greece as the societies burdened with internal 
tensions in addition to supranational challenges. Particu-
larly, we look at the Belgrade Waterfront project in Bel-
grade and the Hellinikon project in Athens as the cases that 
blend very well with the logic of exception ingrained in the 
urban megaproject development. More precisely, we apply 
the MLG conceptual framework as previously described to 
elucidate the following variables: the nature of incentives of 
private developers (e.g. functional, i.e. directed to profit only 
and/or of exercising political influence); the response of the 
state public authorities (e.g. reactive, i.e. fully supportive to 
the investors’ demands and/or proactive, i.e. enabling the 
setting for addressing both private and public interests); 
the position of planners towards the partnerships between 
investors and public authorities; and, the level of public 
engagement as a response to the main coalitions in urban 
megaproject development.
To collect the relevant data, we use the insight into vari-
ous documents. Notably, the triangulation approach in data 
generation helps to obtain as objective as possible under-
standing about the ongoing urban development in Belgrade 
and Athens. More precisely, we collect (1) official docu-
mentation (national laws, plans, strategies, regulations, and 
contracts) that depict the position of the state authorities 
towards megaproject development, (2) secondary sources, 
i.e. the scholarly articles on the current urban development 
in Serbia and Greece that provide a critical perspective on 
the current urban practices, and (3) newsletter articles and 
media announcements, which illustrate the general narrative 
behind the implementation of the selected cases.
Accordingly, to analyse the obtained data, we apply: (1) 
the documentary analysis of primary sources, to elucidate 
critical relationships between the foreign developers’ incen-
tives and the national governments’ responses to them, (2) 
the content analysis of scholarly articles on the current 
developmental challenges, to identify the professional posi-
tion to current development trends and the nature of citizen 
engagement in the public issues with considerable spatial 
impact, and (3) the discourse analysis of the newspaper arti-
cles and media announcements, to unveil the nature of com-
munication channels about megaproject trends.
The Balkans’ urban megaprojects: cases 
from Serbia and Greece
Serbia: the socio‑spatial setting 
under a ‘proto‑democracy’
The transition of Serbia towards neoliberal society is slow 
and full of various obstacles. The political dictatorship 
ended in 2000, however, a political culture based on rudi-
mentary pluralism, together with a low level of adminis-
trative and financial decentralization (Peric 2020a), makes 
the Serbian society a ‘proto-democracy’ even today (Vujo-
sevic 2010). Moreover, the lack of political and institu-
tional reforms, as well as adequate strategy, measures, 
and mechanisms towards a market economy has led to a 
chaotic situation in which only Serbian and foreign oli-
garchs have been able to assert their interests (Nedovic-
Budic et al. 2012). Professional expertise is still shaped 
by the principles of comprehensive planning and as such 
shows neither affection for the needs of the free market 
in the area of spatial development (Nedovic-Budic and 
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Cavric 2006; Vujosevic and Nedovic-Budic 2006), nor 
for the necessity for collaborative planning introduced 
by informal strategic planning with the involvement of 
large (foreign) funds such as UN-Habitat and the Deutshe 
Gesselschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
(Lazarevic-Bajec 2009; Peric and Miljus 2017). Participa-
tory mechanisms are still rarely used in planning practice, 
whilst planners often show a great disinterest, mistrust, 
and fear of communicating with the public (Maricic et al. 
2018). As a consequence, citizens are usually not included 
in any kind of decision-making, hence, acting as passive 
observers of the ongoing spatial transformation (Cveti-
novic et al. 2017). Only grassroots movements appear to 
perform as advocates of the public interest (Grubbauer 
and Camprag 2019).
The Belgrade Waterfront project, Belgrade
Through history, the development of the Belgrade waterfront 
area has always received a great attention from urban profes-
sionals, politicians, and citizens (Peric 2020a; Kovacevic 
2014; Grubbauer and Camprag 2019). The idea to create the 
new urban centre of Belgrade on the right bank of the Sava 
River dates back to the first master plan of Belgrade of 1923. 
Its potential was further analysed in numerous academic 
studies and urban design competitions throughout 1970s and 
1980s, e.g. the Home of Friendship (1975) (Fig. 3), and the 
Town on Water (1990) (Fig. 4). Even in time of an immense 
economic crisis in the 1990s, the project Europolis (1995) 
was considered a flagship project. Since the beginning of 
the new millennium, the 90-ha area has been continuously 
deteriorating to, finally, transform into a huge brownfield 
area in the Belgrade urban core occupied mainly by an old 
shunting yard as part of the Belgrade main railway station 
and some dilapidated housing.
The Belgrade Waterfront (BW) project was announced 
during the 2012 political campaign of the then largest 
opposition party. After winning the elections, the party 
fulfilled its promise: the construction of a grand political 
project financed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) inves-
tor, Eagle Hills, with considerable subsidies by the Serbian 
government, commenced in September 2015. The prelimi-
nary design project by SOM (Skidmore, Owings & Merrill) 
served as a base for the final project design by the local plan-
ning and architectural offices (Fig. 5), to comprise an area 
for over 6,000 flats (1 million  m2) with 20,000 inhabitants, 
but also numerous commercial and cultural activities, a huge 
park, a new shopping centre, and a hotel, which at 210 m 
will be the highest building in the Balkans (Radojevic 2017). 
The construction costs are estimated at 3.1 to 8 billion euros, 
with the timeframe for completion of the project including 
the three phases being 2045 (Eagle Hills 2015).
Belgrade Waterfront: urban development under hybrid 
democracy
To elucidate the process that led to the implementation of 
the Belgrade Waterfront project in September 2015, the fol-
lowing lines describe specifically the positions and interre-
lations amongst various stakeholders, namely: Eagle Hills 
as developer, the Serbian government and the City of Bel-
grade, Urban Planning Institute and the Republic Agency 
for Spatial Planning as planning professionals, and NGOs 
‘Don’t let Belgrade d(r)own’ and the ‘Ministry of Space’, as 
representatives of the civil sector.
Developers. The Abu Dhabi-based company Eagle Hills 
invests mainly in the Middle East, but also in Ethiopia, 
Morocco, Jordan, and Serbia (Radojevic 2017). Selected 
upon direct negotiations with the Serbian government, i.e. 
without international bidding, Eagle Hills got numerous sub-
ventions to invest in BW. In addition to the environmental 
restoration, the removal of obsolete infrastructure, and the 
provision of the new one, the state is obliged to lease the 
land to the developer for 99 years (OG RS 3/2013). Notably, 
the latter excludes any fee for Eagle Hills whilst: (1) leasing 
the land; (2) getting the right of land ownership once the 
building stock is constructed and a month after a use-permit 
is obtained; and (3) transferring the right of land ownership 
to other parties. Practically, the land is given for free to for-
eign developers.
Public sector. The cooperation between the Govern-
ment of United Arab Emirates and the Government of the 
Republic of Serbia was legally approved as a basis for the 
development of the BW project (OG RS 3/2013). The power 
relations amongst the two are, however, not balanced as the 
mentioned law obliged Serbia to approve all amendments 
to any other legislative act in the manner desirable for the 
foreign investor. To illustrate this, the Lex Specialis – Act 
on Establishing the Public Interest and Special Procedures 
of Expropriation and the Issuance of Building Permit for the 
Project Belgrade Waterfront (OG RS 34/2015) was adopted 
although certain directives transposing the law were missing 
(Maruna 2015; Zekovic et al. 2018). Such a legal irregularity 
provides a room for different malversations infringing the 
public interest. In addition, solely the high-level politics is 
in charge of strategic decision-making—e.g. the main initia-
tor of the project was the then-prime minister, today (2020) 
the process is led by the president. The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that both functions are embodied in 
the same person.
Planning professionals. The plan making procedure 
involved only two domestic institutions. The urban plan-
ning office of the City of Belgrade – Urban Planning Insti-
tute, created the Belgrade Waterfront Concept Masterplan 
in July 2014 based on the design project by SOM (Cukic 
and Peric 2019). This step is at odds with a routine planning 
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procedure, where a plan covers all the provisions necessary 
for the design of a project (Kovacevic 2014). In addition, 
the BW Concept Masterplan strongly differs to the nature 
of the Belgrade master plan (Zekovic et al. 2018), and, 
consequently, in September 2014, it was just ex post added 
as Amendments to the Master Plan of Belgrade (OG CB 
70/2014). According to the procedural regulations, to imple-
ment high-tier urban plans means to produce a series of sec-
ond-tier regulatory plans, approved in a round of debates by 
the planning commissions and the public. To avoid this, the 
Government decided to introduce the specific spatial plan,2 
as a higher tier document demanding less coordination on 
the local level (Kovacevic 2014). This plan was prepared 
Fig. 3  The home of friendship. Source: 70 Years of Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade—Book II: Plans. 2018. Copyright: Urban Planning 
Institute of Belgrade
2 According to Serbian nomenclature of plans, the spatial plans are 
prepared for: (1) republic, (2) regions, (3) city/municipality, and (4) 
non-urban areas of particular importance—mining and coal seams, 
flooding areas, natural resorts, etc. The spatial plan for BW was 
assigned to the latter category.
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by the Republic Agency for Spatial Planning (RASP) in 
full accordance to the BW Masterplan. However, the plan-
ning law from December 2014 (OG RS 132/14) revoked 
the RASP and appointed the Serbian Ministry of Construc-
tion, Transport and Infrastructure as a body in charge of 
the further plan development. The spatial plan of Belgrade 
Waterfront (OG RS 7/2015) was adopted in January 2015.
Civil sector. Represented by two NGOs, the civil sec-
tor organized a range of activities usually following the 
governmental decisions beneficial for Eagle Hills. As a 
reaction to the proposed amendments to the Master Plan 
of Belgrade, the citizens of Belgrade made over 3000 com-
plaints, whilst more than 200 people actively participated 
in the public insight pointing out all kinds of irregularities 
proposed by the master plan amendments. Although the ses-
sion lasted for more than six hours, all of the complaints 
were rejected, or only superficially taken into consideration, 
and the Amendments to the Master Plan of Belgrade (OG 
Fig. 4  The town on water. Source: 70 Years of Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade—Book II: Plans. 2018. Copyright: Urban Planning Institute 
of Belgrade
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CB 70/2014) were verified in September 2014 (Cukic et al. 
2015; Peric 2020b). Despite this, the civil sector continued 
with public discussions. Through the open debate with aca-
demics “What is hidden beneath the surface of the ‘Belgrade 
Waterfront’” in October 2014 parallelly to the spatial plan 
making procedure and the creative performance “Operation 
lifebelt” in November 2014 during the public meeting on the 
approval of the Plan for the Area of Specific Use, the activ-
ists tried to attend to the shortcomings as presented in the 
plan. Again, the political structures embodied in the plan-
ning commission stayed ‘deaf’ to the citizens’ calls resulting 
in the adoption of the preliminary version of the spatial plan 
two months later, thus excluding all public remarks (Cukic 
and Peric 2019; Peric 2020b). Even after the start of con-
struction of the BW project in September 2015, citizens reg-
ularly organized the protests in 2016 and 2017. The public 
revolt, however, did not prevent the further development of 
the area. Currently (2020), several housing objects, a shop-
ping mall, a great deal of road infrastructure and public open 
spaces have been finalized and open for public.
Greece: the socio‑spatial setting under the economic 
downturn
Greece was severely challenged by the downturn on the 
international financial markets in 2008/2009, which gen-
erated a prolonged economic crisis. A major state-funded 
recapitalisation of the financial system aimed at boosting 
economic growth and reducing unemployment (Hadjimicha-
lis 2011). However, Greek excessive private debt forced 
emergency measures in support of private real estate invest-
ments (Prentou 2012). These investments appeared to be 
speculative, i.e. highlighting the benefits of proposals from 
lenders and developers associated with high-level politi-
cians, but highly opaque and made without involvement of 
public officials (Papaioannou and Nikolakopoulou 2016). 
For example, the Hellenic Republic Asset Development 
Fund (HRADF) in fact serves to pursue the push towards 
privatisation of public land and assets by transferring the 
responsibility of many services and public agencies into 
private entities (Prentou 2012; Peric and Hoch 2017). Local 
planning officials, however, stay connected to the urbanism 
planning tradition, thus, considering planning as blueprint 
plan making instead of creating the guidelines to effectively 
manage a planning process as a complex activity involv-
ing numerous actors. Even worse, some apply corruptible 
measures to authorize often illegal urban growth (Getimis 
and Giannakourou 2014). On top of this, despite the decen-
tralization of spatial planning in the 1990s, aimed at giving 
more responsibility to lower-tier public bodies (municipal 
and regional authorities), public engagement as part of link 
between local institutions and the local people remains weak 
(Giannakourou 2011). The planning practice is dominated 
by “the bureaucratic administrative culture, encouraging 
reliance on narrow disciplinary expertise unable and unwill-
ing to cope with the increasingly complex spatial problems” 
Fig. 5  Belgrade Waterfront—a model. Source: www.belgr adewa terfr ont.com. Copyright: Eagle Hills
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(Pappas cited in Papamichail and Peric 2018, p. 335). As a 
result, professionals cannot do much to restrict close feed-
back between developers and politicians, hence, repeatedly 
posing crises for effective spatial development (Papamichail 
and Peric 2018; Komninos 2014; Zifou 2015).
The Hellinikon project, Athens
Since its opening in 1938, the Hellinikon airport has always 
been an important strategic area for both Greeks and inter-
nationals (Milionis 2010; Prentou 2012; Komninos 2014; 
Pollalis 2012). In the period of its full operation, it served as 
the main Greek airport, whilst partly also as a US military 
base (1953–1991). At its waterfront nearby, the Agios Kos-
mas National Youth Centre was opened in 1961. Situated 
only 10 km south from the Athens downtown, the airport 
was constantly upgraded to reach its critical capacity in the 
1990s. After the decision to build the new Athens airport in 
Spata in 1995, the Hellinikon airport was officially closed 
in 2001. For the 2004 Olympic Games, the former airport 
and a coastal front line hosted a number of sports. Between 
1995 and 2011, the national and local (both metropolitan 
and municipality) governments financed a number of com-
petitions and studies to explore the possibilities of future 
development of the area. The proposals presented in 2011 
are: the Hellinikon Strategic Urban Model (Fig. 6), and the 
Metropolitan Green Park (Fig. 7), revolving around a low-
cost–low-revenue strategy for social and environmental ben-
efit of Athenians, as well as more economically viable solu-
tions like the Hellinikon Urban Development Model (Fig. 8).
The first idea towards privatisation, attracting devel-
opers and making profit out of the Hellinikon redevelop-
ment—measuring a total area of 626 ha, 528 ha of the for-
mer airport and 98 ha of the coastal zone—appeared soon 
after the economic crisis hit (Komninos 2014; Prentou 
2012). The negotiations first started with the Qatar gov-
ernment in 2010, but the European competition regulations 
forced the Greek government to open a call for investments 
with accompanying institutions and regulations: in May 
2011, Hellinikon SA (a société anonyme) was established 
in charge of administration, management, and exploitation 
of the land and facilities of the Hellinikon area (Pollalis 
2012), whilst two months later the law enlisted the area 
as the state-owned asset ready for privatisation (Prentou 
2012). After shortlisting four investors in 2012, Lamda, 
a Greek consortium with international shareholders, 
was finally chosen in November 2014, with a deadline 
for the acquisition of 100% of the share capital of Hell-
inikon SA set for November 2016 (The Hellinikon Project 
2020). This is still pending as the regime of leftist Syriza 
Fig. 6  Hellinikon strategic urban model. Source: Hellinikon Strategic Urban Model: New Urban Centrality for Innovation, 2011. Copyright: 
Josep Acebillo / BcnSuS
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(2015–2019) prevented foreign businesses from operating 
in Greece; nevertheless, immediately after centre-right-
ist New Democracy won the elections in July 2019, the 
new prime minister promised to accelerate the Hellinikon 
development (National Herald 2019; Kampouris 2019). In 
a meantime, Lamda engaged Foster and Partners to pro-
vide a design for the future ‘new city’ within the Athens 
metropolitan area, comprising business, retail, and resi-
dential districts, art venues, a metropolitan park of 200 ha, 
and a revitalised public coastline of 3.5 km (Fig. 9). The 
area will host 40,000 residents and generate 75,000 jobs. 
The total costs are foreseen to 8 billion euros, with the 
implementation period set to 2045 (The Hellinikon Project 
2020).
Hellinikon: economic prosperity for whom?
To present a brief overview and emphasize the most 
important steps and decisions in the process of the Hell-
inikon development, the networks amongst the following 
actors are described: Lamda, the developer, Hellenikon SA 
and HRADF, as local and national public negotiators, the 
National Technical University of Athens (NTUA) and del-
egation of the Association of Greek Architects and Panhel-
lenic Union of Architects (SADAS-PEA), as both academic 
and professional experts, respectively, and the Initiative 
for the Hellinikon Metropolitan Park, as the civil sector 
representative.
Developers. The law prescribing the future development 
of the Hellinikon (OG RG 4062/2012) allows the developer 
to create a mixed-use development without any restrictions 
regarding land uses, with the exception of manufacturing 
(Prentou 2012). On the contrary, the Greek state obliged to 
demolish the buildings already on site, allow blockade of 
the free access to the coast if needed, construct new infra-
structure to and on site, and evict a number of organizations 
located in the facilities within the area (Municipality of Hell-
inikon-Argyroupoli 2013). After a bidding process, in 2014 
the agreement was made with the Athens-based company 
Lamda, with an international consortium of shareholders 
like Chinese Fosun and the UAE Eagle Hills, for the pur-
chase price of 915 million euros (The Hellinikon Project 
Fig. 7  General master plan of Hellinikon Metropolitan Green Park. Source: Basic planning & design principles for the creation of the Metropoli-
tan Green Park at the former Hellinikon International Airport of Athens, 2010. Copyright: NTUA Urban Environment Lab
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Fig. 8  Masterplan—urban development model. Source: Hellinikon Urban Development Model: Former Athens Airport & Agios Kosmas Coast, 
2011. Copyright: Hellinikon SA
Fig. 9  The model of the Hellinikon project. Source: www.thehe llini kon.com. Copyright: Lamda
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2020). The contract for the future development was ratified 
by the Greek Parliament in 2016 after a series of modifi-
cations toward more green, open and public areas, and a 
socially responsible development, as demanded by the then-
prime minister (Kampouris 2019). This document was, nev-
ertheless, subject to a number of administrative adjustments, 
so the final contractual preconditions have been approved by 
means of Joint Ministerial decisions just in late 2019 (The 
Hellinikon Project 2020).
Public sector. The positions of public sector towards 
developer’s vision were changing depending on the politi-
cal profile of the ruling parties. In 2010, it was the Greek 
government that initiated idea on the Hellinikon redevel-
opment. Following the directives from the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the European 
Central Bank, in 2011 the HRADF was established to nego-
tiate with international bidders (Prentou 2012), whilst the 
mentioned law 4062/2012 was amongst those following “a 
fast track approval process under the direct responsibility 
of the prime minister’s office” (Karadimitriou and Pagonis 
2019, p. 1227). By placing the debate about the Hellinikon 
redevelopment on the highest administrative level, Greece 
showed its commitment to pursuing privatisation as a desir-
able way to reduce national debt. However, the change of the 
regime brought important changes in terms of limiting the 
extraordinary benefits for developer, and instead focusing on 
broader social values. In the last five years, the collabora-
tion between the highest administrative structures shifted 
to the local level—including local municipalities, regional 
authorities, archaeological councils, numerous ministries, 
professionals, and civic organizations (Kampouris 2019). 
The new government is determined to speed up the process 
(National Herald 2019).
Planning professionals. Since the very first ideas on 
the Hellinikon redevelopment, there was always a tension 
between mostly internationally renowned experts, who were 
invited to promote the privatisation strategy, and domestic 
planners and architects focused on the local needs, values 
and identities (Komninos 2014; Pollalis 2012). Among the 
latter, particularly inventive was academia, e.g. the NTUA 
Urban Environment Lab’s proposal from 2010 envisioned 
a public metropolitan park, with scarce recreational, cul-
tural, and research activities, focused on the social needs 
and environment protection (Prentou 2012). However, the 
law that served as a base for the development bids (OG RG 
4062/2012) neglected the broader values as well as provi-
sions for the long-term sustainability effects of a concrete 
project. As a consequence, the delegation of the SADAS-
PEA immediately issued an appeal against the law, against 
the transfer of the area to the HRADF and, finally, against 
the sale of the area (Prentou 2012). In the following years, 
professionals and public authorities tried to jointly safeguard 
the public interest. However, even left-wing Syriza, that 
toppled a longstanding dual-party political system, was not 
able or even not willing to ‘correct’ the neoliberal reform 
that was spurred by the 2008 financial crisis (D’hondt 2017).
Civil sector. The representatives of the civil sector were 
numerous, active and agile in organising different types of 
activities—from public debates, to open demonstrations 
(Prentou 2102; Milionis 2010; Komninos 2014). Before the 
narrative on the Hellinikon’s privatisation became dominant 
in 2010, the local activities were mainly supported by local 
and regional authorities. Later on, the initiatives became 
more oriented towards the sustainable use of land at the 
same time bringing the issue to the city, and even inter-
national scale. For example, the Urban Farm, established 
in January 2011, focused on planting vegetables and fruits, 
organising courses and networking with related initiatives on 
a 0.3 ha-lot at the Hellinikon site. The largest movement was 
the Initiative for the Hellinikon Metropolitan Park, launched 
in March 2011, which gathered 76 local and regional initia-
tives to: sign the open letter against privatisation (March 
2011); organize a festival (May–September 2011), includ-
ing concerts, forum, beach party, free exhibition, and four 
discussions and round tables; engage more than 3000 resi-
dents and institutions from Athens to plant 1100 olive trees 
(March 2012); and, organize two protests in Athens against 
the privatisation process and against the law 4062/2012 
(March–April 2012). Metropolitan Community Clinic and 
the Civil Aviation Museum were established on site in 2011, 
whilst during the recent migration crisis the area served as 
a refugee camp. The refugees were forcibly evicted to clear 
the way for redevelopment.
Discussion: the ‘iron‑law of megaprojects’ 
in fragile societies
The Balkans’ megaprojects both show the key features of 
urban megaproject development: long timeframe for pro-
ject implementation, extreme budget, flexibility in land use 
and building regulations, opaque interrelations between the 
stakeholders involved, contested public liability, and devel-
opers as the main actors. However, some characteristics of 
such an exceptional megaproject approach are even more 
strongly emphasized in the fragile societies of Serbia and 
Greece. To elucidate the principles of MLG in the develop-
ment of the urban megaprojects Belgrade Waterfront and 
Hellinikon, we critically address: (1) the multi-level com-
ponent, i.e. vertical cooperation between public authori-
ties, (2) the governance aspect, i.e. horizontal cooperation 
amongst leading stakeholders, (3) the role of intermediaries, 
addressing planning professionals, and (4) the public posi-
tion towards megaproject development.
Megaprojects generally require strong and constant sup-
port from the city administration, and/or other local bodies, 
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with the initial green-light from the national governments. 
In both BW and Hellinikon cases, however, the position of 
the national government dominates, i.e. the local level is 
forced to accept the high-level decisions without any con-
crete involvement of city officials in protecting their local 
needs. For example, the voice of the Mayor of Belgrade was 
only heard because he belonged to the same ruling politi-
cal regime (Maruna 2015), whilst Hellinikon SA as a local 
facilitator was overtaken by the HRADF only half a year 
after its establishment. However, this power of national bod-
ies is distorted when exposed to international influence: the 
Serbian government is far inferior to the UAE government, 
as is the Greek prime minister to the Lamda international 
consortium. Mechanisms such as the ‘authoritarian entrepre-
neurialism’ in the case of BW (Peric 2020a) and the ‘capital 
urbanisation’ of Hellinikon (Komninos 2014) indicate the 
withdrawal of a state from the protection of social values 
using space as a source of speculative economic growth. 
Moreover, contested democracies suffering from an eco-
nomic downturn are incapable to provide a room for bottom-
up deliberation by the authorities. This makes the economi-
cally strong supranational bodies also politically superior 
in the development of numerous urban megaprojects in a 
certain country, whilst local entities are neglected.
The cooperation between numerous stakeholders, as 
presumed by the MLG’s attribute of functional unity, is 
called into question in the Balkans’ megaprojects. Namely, 
the cooperation between developers and national authori-
ties on the one hand, and revolted citizens on the other, is 
highly polarised. For example, BW got the status of a project 
of national importance, even though the Serbian govern-
ment does not initiate the project solely, but in a speculative 
partnership with foreign developers (OG RS 1/12). How-
ever, there is a great imbalance in economic turnover for 
both sides. Lex specialis (OG RS 34/2015) undoubtedly 
allows land expropriation for the commercial project only 
in the interest of Eagle Hills, whilst the national interest 
is declared as creating new workplaces and assigning the 
construction work to the Serbian subcontractors (Peric and 
Hoch 2017). Notably, pointing to such misuse of territorial 
capital has been interpreted as a direct attack on the state 
and its continued growth, severely hindering any kind of 
democratic public participation. Similarly, the law on the 
Hellinikon development (OG RG 4062/2012) allows flex-
ibility in planning the area, clearly opening up a room for 
casinos, luxury hotels, condominiums, and shopping malls 
without this being of social, environmental and economic 
benefit to the Athens metropolitan area and its inhabitants. 
The popular narrative revolved around the ‘national eco-
nomic development’ and ‘the creation of thousands of new 
jobs’ (Municipality of Hellinikon-Argyroupoli 2013). How-
ever, the opponents of such a development (e.g. Syriza) were 
accused of being in favour of prolonging the economic crisis 
and slowing down the recovery (Kampouris 2019).
As the MLG approach is based on a complex network 
of different stakeholders, the presence of experts open to 
the opinions of other stakeholders seems to be central to 
efficient facilitation in the process of urban megaproject 
development. Both case studies, however, show a neglect 
of experts (both public officials and academics) by politi-
cal structures supported by the developers. The principle of 
cronyism dominates the planning practice in Serbia: the UPI 
leaders, responsible for making the BW Concept Masterplan, 
are close to the ruling political party, thus being dependent 
on and under high pressure from the ruling regime when 
making the planning documents. Similarly, the takeover of 
RASP by the Serbian Ministry of Construction, Transport 
and Infrastructure is another example of a weak professional 
position. Moreover, the tasks of plan preparation and its 
expert control executed by one and the same government 
body constitute a “direct conflict of interests, a centraliza-
tion of power, and a lack of transparency in the BW pro-
cess” (Peric 2020a, p. 224). In addition to such a dominant 
politization of urban planning, planners themselves prove 
incapable of understanding the pluralist social reality in 
which different interests shape urban development; instead, 
they continue to acknowledge the unitary public interest, 
whilst diminishing the importance of negotiations with other 
relevant parties. Politicians wisely recognize such a profes-
sional disadvantage and use it to reinforce their own close 
feedback with developers. Greek planners were more active: 
academics proposed solutions for creative land use that went 
beyond the mixed-use development aimed at economic ben-
efits but neglecting social needs and environmental pres-
ervation, whilst professionals boldly pointed out a number 
of decisions that violated public interests. However, their 
demands were eventually neglected in the same way as in 
Serbia—‘starchitects’ like SOM and Foster and Partners, 
engaged in BW and Hellinikon at the request of developers, 
prevailed over local experts and local needs.
In both cases, the civil sector plays a key role, both by 
engaging with the general public and by supporting plan-
ning professionals. The BW project generated the skilled and 
organized civil sector, which was the first and most persistent 
actor to designate a number of irregularities in the BW plan-
ning process. Public authorities, however, remained indif-
ferent to its demands. The Hellinikon project shows an even 
greater commitment from the civil sector, which benefited 
from the creative use of the site, whilst project development 
stagnated. However, with the renewed discourse of slow 
economic recovery, new constellations between the national 
government and Lamda developers delegitimize the role of 
the civil sector and marginalize the public interest. All this 
simply represents the current spatial planning paradigm in 
fragile societies: ignorance of democratic decision-making 
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and attracting investments for major redevelopment projects 
through ad hoc approaches (Zekovic et al. 2015; Komninos 
2014).
Concluding remarks
The possibility of rapidly generating immense financial 
benefits exclusively for private developers makes urban 
megaprojects the cause of social distortion in societies fac-
ing wild neoliberalism and a declining economy. This is 
particularly evident in the following: instead of exercising 
control over market-oriented development, high-level rep-
resentatives of the public sector establish close (business) 
relationships with foreign developers; such partnerships can-
not be curbed by incompetent planning professionals; finally, 
the civil sector is forced to use its informal mechanisms in 
the struggle against regulatory capitalism. The following 
lines highlight the most remarkable episodes from both cases 
that serve for creating the ‘lessons learnt’ for similar socio-
spatial settings.
Serbia, as a country that has not only economic problems, 
but also a considerable lack of democratic political culture, 
proves to be more vulnerable than Greece to the effects of 
megaprojects. Eagle Hills was selected as the developer for 
BW without an open tender, i.e. in a bilateral negotiation 
process between the highest representatives of both the UAE 
and the Serbian governments, with extremely unfavourable 
conditions for Serbia. Developer Lamda for the Hellinikon 
project was chosen through a bidding procedure and, moreo-
ver, during the Syriza rule (2015–2109), the project was 
put on hold. The political narrative of the new ruling elite, 
however, inevitably resembles the discourse of the Serbian 
government counterparts.
Apart from a few individuals motivated by the NGOs’ 
commitment, Serbian planners and architects, both 
academics and practitioners, did not provide a mature 
response to the decline of the national territorial capital. 
For example, the Serbian National Association of Archi-
tects’ complaint against the original spatial concept of the 
BW project neglected the importance of complying to the 
basic procedural steps in such a megaproject development; 
instead, Serbian professionals criticized the BW proposal 
only for its architectural merits (Maruna 2015). In this 
way, the experts clearly show that they are still close to 
the paradigm of ‘blueprint’ planning, rather than being 
able to understand the complexity and causal reactions 
amongst the public, but also the civil and private sectors. 
Greek professionals, however, were active not only in rais-
ing their voices against the capital urbanisation, but also 
in providing alternative spatial solutions for protecting 
social goals.
The emergence of grassroot movements in both Serbia 
and Greece clearly indicate the extent of the usurpation 
of public goods and the violation of the public interest 
during privatisation. Compared to two active NGOs in 
Belgrade, in the Hellinikon case, a wider network of civil 
movements, also supported by professional associations 
and local and regional authorities, made the citizens’ voice 
more influential. Finally, aimed at fighting against a ruling 
political regime in Serbia, the NGO ‘Don’t let Belgrade 
d(r)own’ has been transformed into a political party.
Urban megaprojects lead to deregulation, and, conse-
quently, question the role and purpose of urban planning, 
too. As a result, some contexts prove to be more vulnerable 
in protecting their own territorial capital. The attachment 
to institutional patronage in Greece and political favourit-
ism in Serbia undermines the relevance of urban planning. 
However, transforming these conditions requires a vari-
ety of social, political and economic changes that go far 
beyond what plans can achieve. Some basic recommenda-
tions for reducing the negative externalities of megaproject 
development are as follows (Peric 2020a; Grubbauer and 
Camprag 2019; Zekovic et al. 2018):
 (1) Clear recognition of national interest instead of glori-
fying the neoliberal principles;
 (2) Dismiss of high-level politicians’ nationalist narrative 
whilst advertising urban megaprojects;
 (3) Decrease of political clientelism via urban megapro-
jects and introduction of anti-corruption mechanisms;
 (4) Reassessment of regulatory mechanisms to precisely 
define the public interest;
 (5) Real decentralization of power instead of its declara-
tive announcement in the legislation;
 (6) Strengthening the organizational and financial capac-
ity of municipalities as a prerequisite to the bottom-up 
decision-making;
 (7) Encouraging mutual trust, joint actions and transpar-
ent decision-making procedures amongst the repre-
sentatives of public, private and civil sector;
 (8) Boosting the autonomy of planners whilst creating the 
original planning concepts and tailor-made proposals;
 (9) Use of innovative (both formal and informal) plan-
ning instruments to improve the public dialogue and 
facilitate participation of all relevant actors;
 (10) Enabling an effective feedback between the public 
sector planners and citizens to create trust, mutual 
respect, and cooperation.
In sum, all these steps serve to reinforce strategic deci-
sion-making and eventually pave the way for a new planning 
culture. However, as planning culture grasps a variety of 
aspects—from the socio-political conditions of a society, to 
behaviours, habits and unwritten rules pursued by various 
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representatives of social action, the transformation of a plan-
ning culture is considered a highly complex and incremen-
tal approach. Against such a comprehensive background, it 
becomes clear that planners are only one puzzle in the over-
all picture. It is not enough for planners to learn new skills 
and react flexibly to a rapidly changing world if such profes-
sional progress lacks support from the society in which it is 
embedded. It is why the Balkans, as a highly challenging 
setting almost always marked by political, economic and 
social turmoil, is particularly dependent on effective stra-
tegic cooperation—across scales and sectors—to properly 
cope with the complexity of megaproject development and 
protect its territorial capital from further erosion.
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